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There has been widespread interest in the policy community in the distributional effects of trade liber-
alization. Recent anti-globalization rhetoric has focused on the potential negative impact of trade and
outsourcing for unskilled wages in developed countries, while arguing that it may also hurt workers in poor
countries. On the other hand, many economists regard trade liberalization as an instrument for increasing
growth, but are less certain about the distributional effects of increased openness.
Driven in large part by continued policy interest, the relationship between trade openness and wages
has also been an active topic of debate in the research community.1 However, this literature focuses on
the functional distribution of income, with less emphasis on household distribution issues.2 The current
literature has stressed theoretical linkages based on the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. In this context, tariff
reductions in poor labor-abundant countries are expected to increase the real income of workers and hurt
capital owners (or skilled labor). In developed countries the opposite effect is expected. The empirical
evidence remains mixed and somewhat contradictory.
In this paper, we follow Bourguignon and Morrisson (1989, 1990) and Spilimbergo et al. (1999) and
use an ownership matrix that allows us to move from functional to household income. We then obtain a
general function of the personal income distribution in terms of endowments, tariffs and the ownership
structure. Using this analytical framework, we analyze the impact of trade and tariffs on the household
distribution of income in general equilibrium. 3
Treating equity issues as relevant, we work with Sen-type social welfare functions (Sen, 1974) and
embed inequality indexes in social welfare functions. In particular, we work with the widely used Gini co-
efﬁcient and with the Atkinson family of inequality indexes (Atkinson, 1970), although other indexes may
be employed. Using this framework we are able to decompose the general equilibrium import protection
effects into real income level and dispersion changes.
The efﬁciency properties of tariffs are well developed in the literature. What we highlight here is how
distributional aspects of social welfare related to import protection may be examined alongside efﬁciency
aspects. For government, this is manifested not only in special interest politics, but also through the di-
rect impact of inequality on a government’s objective function. We ﬁnd that equity considerations may
serve to counter lobbying interests in both capital-rich and capital-poor countries, though with an opposite
marginal impact on the ﬁnal policy outcome. Although we focus our attention only on import tariffs, the
main message that follows from this approach can be applied in a more general context of trade policy
instruments. The precise distributional and efﬁciency components may change, but in essence the trade-off
and interrelation between both economic outcomes is still present.
Thepaperisorganizedasfollows. Section2developsaformalrepresentationofsocialwelfareinclusive
1Comprehensive surveys are provided by Richardson (1995), Cline (1997) and Feenstra and Hanson (2004).
2Recent papers on this topic include Edwards (1997), Higgins and Williamson (1999), Barro (2000) and Spilimbergo et al. (2001).
3Also see Anderson (2002). While the paper is focused on a different set of issues (his goal is to explore the public ﬁnance concept
of the marginal cost of funds in general equilibrium), he also stresses the decomposition of general equilibrium welfare effects into a
composition (i.e. efﬁciency) effect and a distributional effect.
2of income inequality. In Section 3, we embed this social welfare function into a general equilibrium trade
model. We also develop the equilibrium representation of inequality, based on the general equilibrium
system fundamentals. Section 4 then explores linkages between trade policy, inequality, and welfare. It
also examines theoretical linkages between country size, development, policy, and inequality. In Section 5,
we explore the implications of the addition of inequality to the social welfare component of a government’s
objective function for political support function models of tariff formation. We conclude in Section 6.
2 Deﬁning social welfare with respect to inequality
Ourgoalinthissectionistodevelopafunctionallinkagebetweeninequalityandaggregate(social)welfare.
This will then be integrated in the next section into a dual general equilibrium trade model. A critical
condition for inequality to have a meaningful link to aggregate (social) welfare is that the utility function
be strictly concave with respect to income. Additionally, for tractability we prefer to work with a social
welfare function that is symmetric and additively separable in individual utilities.
The existence of social welfare functions depends crucially on the possibility to compare interpersonal
utility levels. One such possibility is offered by the ‘veil of ignorance’ approach ﬁrst proposed by Harsanyi
(1953, 1955) and further developed by Rawls (1971), where we rank different individual situations not
knowing which would be the actual situation. As stated by Sen (1997) this interpersonal comparison can
be deﬁned as those situations where we make judgements of the type:
”I would prefer to be person A rather than person B in this situation” and ”while we do not
really have the opportunity (or perhaps the misfortune, as the case may be) of in fact becoming
A or B, we can think quite systematically about such a choice, and indeed we seem to make
such comparisons frequently”.
Because GDP per capita is the most common indicator of social welfare, the ‘veil of ignorance’ ap-
proach supports the use of an inequality measure to complement GDP per capita comparisons. If we do not
know which individual household we are in a speciﬁc country, then the expected utility becomes a function
of mean income and the personal distribution of income. How we evaluate the probability of receiving any
given income is then determined by the functional representation of the utility function and more specif-
ically by the degree of concavity of this function. In this context, a natural extension of cross-country
welfare comparisons is to complement GDP per capita levels with some measure of inequality.4
Under the social welfare approach to income distribution measurement, inequality is associated with
variance in the distribution of income. This raises two measurement problems. The ﬁrst is that we cannot
generally rely on ﬁrst moment-based indicators. The second is that even though the concepts of Lorenz-
dominance and general Lorenz-dominance (Shorrocks, 1983) are accepted as ways to impartially rank
two different distributions5, in many cases the Lorenz-curves intersect at least once, so that we obtain
4This approach was formally treated by Sen (1976).
5See Lambert (1993) for details.
3incomplete ranking of distributions. To solve both these problems, inequality indexes are usually used to
rank distributions in indeterminate cases and to provide a summary variable that can be used in empirical
models. While the most commonly used is the Gini coefﬁcient, most inequality measures are implicitly
based on a social welfare function (Dalton, 1920; Kolm, 1969; Atkinson,1970). As such, there is no perfect
index, and any index has built in social preferences.
In this paper, we employ two representations of household utility and social welfare. Both reﬂect Sen’s
(1974) preferred deﬁnition of social welfare as:
SW = y (1 − I) (1)
where SW is the social welfare, y is mean income, and I is an index of inequality.
Starting with CRRA preferences yields the well-known Atkinson inequality index directly as a natu-
ral metric for a mapping from income distribution to social welfare (see Atkinson 1970). In this sense,
Atkinson’s index ﬁts naturally into Sen’s proposed social welfare function.
Sen actually offered equation (1) as deﬁned with respect to the Gini coefﬁcient. In this case, the social
welfare function is axiomatic, in that we do not have an obvious mapping –through aggregation– from
individual preferences to an aggregate social welfare function. This follows because the social welfare
function is then rank sensitive. We work with both the Atkinson index and Gini coefﬁcient in this paper.
2.1 The Atkinson index-based social welfare function
Formally, we deﬁne a composite consumer good over the range of all consumption goods, which follows
from a linear homothetic aggregation function. As such, cost minimization yields a composite consumer
price index. This is deﬁned over all consumer prices pc.
pc = f (p) (2)




























1−θ if θ 6= 1
lnch if θ = 1
(6)
In general, we assume that θ > 0, and in this paper we focus on the case where θ 6= 1.7 We employ a




















With some further manipulation, our equality measure EA can be mapped directly to the Atkinson
index of income inequality, yielding a Sen-type social welfare function. In particular, taking the deﬁnition
of the Atkinson index (Atkinson, 1970), we have the following relationships between the Atkinson index
IA, EA, and social welfare.























Note that as θ → 0 only average income matters, rather than income inequality. Alternatively, when
θ → ∞, then SWA = min
 
yh
and we have the extreme Rawlsian maximin social welfare function,
where the income level of the poorest individual is the only relevant variable and average income is unim-
portant. Moreover, for a given distribution (measured as shares of total income) we have declining marginal
utility of income.
2.2 The Gini index-based social welfare function
The Gini coefﬁcient is deﬁned as twice the area between the Lorenz curve and the 45-degree line. As such,
(1 − G) is then twice the area below the Lorenz curve. Formally, this index is deﬁned as follows:





























6In the present context, constant relative inequality aversion (CRIA) is a better label and acronym.
7One gets the same basic results with log preferences. Estimates in the macro literature are that θ is less than 1.
5where we have arranged households so that y1 ≥ y2 ≥ ... ≥ yn. Unlike the Atkinson-based social
welfare function, the Gini-based social welfare function embodies asymmetry not on speciﬁc individuals,
but rather on relative income rankings. This ranking provides the concavity of the utility function with
respect to income. The higher the income in the ranking, the less social weight it has. At the same time,
equation (12) is linear in average income. As such, SWG is relatively more sensitive to mean income than
SWA and less sensitive to inequality.
3 Inequality and trade in general equilibrium
To explore the interaction between production, trade and trade policy, and inequality, we work with a
modiﬁed dual representation of trade in general equilibrium (Dixit and Norman, 1980). To do so, we ﬁrst
adopt the following additional set of assumptions:
• Rational behavior by households and ﬁrms.
• Complete and perfectly competitive markets.
• Convex technology, with neoclassical production functions.
• Goods are tradable and factors are not.
• Every household has the same neoclassical technology for producing the composite consumption
good.
Given these assumptions, we are able to deﬁne the core general equilibrium system for demand and
production in terms of expenditure and revenue functions, with expenditure deﬁned in terms of the com-
posite consumption good. Social welfare then follows as a set of side equations from the core general
equilibrium system.
3.1 The core general equilibrium system
Because we assume that all households have the same consumption technology deﬁned with respect to the
composite consumption good, we can drop the household index from consumption and represent aggregate
expenditure as a function of aggregate consumption and prices:
e(p,c) = c · f (p) (13)
On the production side, we assume standard neoclassical production functions with constant returns to
scale: xi = gi (vji), where gi (·) is the production function for good i and vji is the use of factor j in the
production of good i. Deﬁning unit input coefﬁcients as aji we also obtain: 1 ≤ gi (aji). Endowment
constraints are then
P
ajixi ≤ vj. From these conditions, we can deﬁne the economy-wide revenue









ajixi ≤ vj and 1 ≤ gi (aji) ∀i,j
)
(14)
From the envelope theorem and the properties of the revenue function r, factor incomes and goods pro-
duction can be expressed in terms of the value of the partial derivatives of the revenue function, evaluated
at the equilibrium set of prices:
∂r(p,v)
∂vj
= wj = wj (p,v) ∀j (15)
∂r(p,v)
∂pi
= xi = xi (p,v) ∀i (16)
Taking equations (15) and (16) in conjunction with equations (13) and (14), we can write the general































p = P∗ + τ = 1 + τ (20)
In equations (17) − (20), we have assumed the home country imposes a tariff of τ on imports from
the rest of the world, while world prices are normalized to one. In addition, ωh
t is the household share
of the tariff revenue and vh
j is the household ownership share of factor j. In the ﬁrst equation, household
consumption is equal to the household budget. Equation (18) deﬁnes imports on which tariff revenue is
generated and equation (19) sets economy wide expenditure equal to national income. Together, the system
of four equations has an equally dimensioned set of unknowns: ch,m,e and p.
3.2 Household inequality
As explained earlier, the recent literature on trade and the distribution of income has focused on the func-
tional distribution of income. The functional distribution of income is also an important building block here
for the representation of the household distribution of income. In equation (21) we deﬁne factor incomes
s, which follow directly from the endowment stock and the properties of the revenue function.
sj = rvj (p,v) · vj = wjvj (21)
Thus, the functional distribution of income is a function of equilibrium prices, preferences, the pro-
duction technology and the endowment set. In reduced form, the functional distribution of income F(s)
8A two-country general equilibrium system can readily be formalized using the same framework.
7is then an artifact of the equilibrium matching of preference and the technology set, given our endowment
vector.
F (s) = F (p,v) (22)
Using factor incomes wj and the household ownership share of production factors, ωh
j we can readily
obtainhouseholdincome. Inaddition, weincludetheassignmentofimporttariffrevenue, againrepresented
by a household share parameter. Equation (23) presents the basic deﬁnition of household income in terms





















τ = 1. In reduced form, the personal distribution of income F(y)
is a consequence of the elements affecting the functional distribution and the h × j ownership matrix of
coefﬁcients ωh
j, represented by Ω:
F (y) = F (p,v,Ω) (25)
Note that social welfare is ultimately a function of the ownership matrix in the economy, while the
impact of trade policy will then depend on the interaction of the underlying economic structure and the
ownership matrix.
3.3 Inequality indexes with system fundamentals
We can write our social metrics of the distribution of income –the Atkinson and Gini indexes– in terms
of system fundamentals. Making a substitution from (23) into (9) and (11), we obtain the following
equations:

























































































y represents the national income share of factor j and
P
j βj + τm
y = 1. In what follows,
we apply the additional normalization that each household receives an equal share of the tariff revenues,
so that ωh
τ = n−1.9
The ratio of the household’s income to per capita income, which accounts for income dispersion, is
given by the sum of the differences between the actual ownership share of factors and equal shares for each
household. From equations (26) and (27), we can make a substitution back into equations (10) and (12),

























































4 Trade policy, distribution, and welfare
From equations (28) and (29) above, social welfare is a function of the ﬁrst two moments of the household
distribution of income. This is especially obvious with the Atkinson index, as it is actually the weighted
variance of income, with inverse income weights, that provides the variance component of the social wel-
farefunction.10 Becausethecontributionsofthemeanandvariancecomponentsofincometosocialwelfare
are separable in equations (28) and (29), we can decompose the impact of trade policy as well into its im-
pact on per-capita income (an efﬁciency effect), and its impact on the variance of income (a distributional
effect). Together, they determine the overall social welfare impact. Formally, differentiating equations (28)
and (29) with respect to tariffs, we obtain the following equations:
∂SWA
∂τ


















































9The distributional impact of tariff revenues can be substantial. This is the emphasis of the paper by Galor (1994), which includes
tariffs in his general equilibrium Overlapping-Generations model.
10While the functional form is different, the social welfare function underlying other income distribution indexes yields a similar
result, though with different weights in the variance component of the welfare function. The CRRA function yields a particularly
clear and parsimonious reduced form.
9How do we interpret equations (30) and (31)? The efﬁciency component is well known (see for exam-
ple Dixit and Norman, 1980; Anderson and Neary, 1992), and is shown here in equation (32). Basically,
the impact of the tariff on per-capita income will depend on the combination of terms-of-trade and alloca-


























For a small country, negative allocation effects outweigh the terms-of-trade effects, so that the impact
of the tariff on mean income is strictly negative. Also, for the small country, the impact on the cost of
living will be to raise prices. As such, the real mean-income effect will be strictly negative for a small
country. With a large country, the combined income and cost-of-living effect, or in other words the real
income effect of the tariff change as represented by the term in square brackets in the equations (30) and
(31) may be positive or negative depending on the magnitude of terms-of-trade effects.
The impact on household income distribution, the other part of equations (30) and (31), follows from













































































Note that we also have an inverse income weighting, by a factor of θ, in equation (33) applied to
induced changes in income. The weighting of induced changes in income for the Gini index depends on
the ranking of individual households on the relative income scale.
Close inspection of equations (33) and (34) reveals a more general relationship between inequality and




















In this context, assuming we adopt a Sen-type social welfare function (where we also allow for a






















































matrix and our ethical weights, where factor price changes in turn depend on Stolper-Samuelson derivatives
and the induced price changes that follow from tariff changes. This is expressed in equation (38), where
the term
∂βj















We can also represent the relationship in elasticity terms: εβj,τ = εwj,pεp,τ − εy,τ.
4.1 Social Welfare with Inequality in the 2x2 Model
Assuming that inequality is the result of uneven distribution of an asset that is indexed by k, we can
apply equation (35) to a two-factor, two-good Heckscher-Ohlin model. In this framework, equation (39)















Inequality is purely a function of the allocation of assets in this model. At the same time, the impact of the
tariff is then a function of which sector is protected. If protection leads to a drop in asset income, inequality
is reduced. Alternatively, if asset income is protected, we will see a rise in inequality. Note that our
discussion in terms of assets includes both the 2x2 capital-labor and 2x2 skilled-unskilled versions of the
Heckscher-Ohlin model found in the literature on the functional distribution of income. The interpretation
of βk with physical capital is obvious. If we instead are working with skilled and unskilled labor in the




where βs is the income share
of skilled labor, interpreted as including both the basic labor and skill component of skilled labor income,
and where s and u index skilled and unskilled workers. 11 Substituting skill for capital, we will arrive at
equation (39).
While inequality depends on relative factor incomes, the social welfare effect will depend on the trade-
off between real income effects following from import protection, and the impact on inequality. In other
words, the trade-off between equity and efﬁciency. From equations (36) and (37), this is ultimately a
function of the degree of inequality aversion, combined with the structural features of the economy and
11Formally, assume ﬁrst that unskilled labor earns wu and skilled labor earns ws, where wu < ws. We can then decompose the
skilled labor price into two components, such that ws = wu +(ws − wu). If we deﬁne skill as an asset with return rk, then we can
now deﬁne rk = (ws − wu). Viewed this way, all households have been endowed with a claim on income equal to the price of a unit
of basic labor earning wu, while some have also been endowed with a claim on the income of a unit of skill. The distribution of this
claim on skill income is then the source of inequality. In share terms, we will have βs = nsn−1
u βu+βk, or, βk = βs−nsn−1
u βu.
11its market power on world markets. For a small country, real income effects will be strictly negative,
while inequality effects may be positive or negative, depending on the relative endowment structure of the
economy. For a large country, it is possible for both effects to work in the same direction. However, in this
case, note that positive terms-of-trade gains will slow any rise (or slow any fall) in capital income shares,
from equation (38). This in turn means that terms of trade effects will tend to mitigate the inequality effects
of protection.
On the basis of equations (38) and (39), we can summarize our discussion above with the following
observations about import protection and inequality in the 2x2 Heckscher-Ohlin model.
Observation 1 Inasmall2x2economywithinequalitydeterminedbyunevendistributionofassets(capital
or skill), tariffs will cause inequality to rise (fall) if assets in the economy are relatively scarce (abundant).
If we take the factor in the 2x2 model that is unevenly distributed as assets (capital or skill), then from
equation (39), changes in inequality indexes depend strictly on a weighted sum of the change in the share
of income going to those assets,
∂βk
∂τ . From the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, the income share of those
assets will rise (fall) with a tariff if the economy is asset poor (rich). Weights are assigned to households





Atkinson and the Gini case. This means that the change in incomes for households holding more capital
than average or households holding skilled labor, and hence more income than average, determine the sign
of the income effect. As a result we will have a rise (fall) in equality as a capital poor (rich) country
imposes a tariff.
On the basis of Observation 1 we can immediately make the following statements about asset rich and
poor Heckscher-Ohlin economies.
Corollary 1 In a small asset-poor Heckscher-Ohlin economy, where the mean real-income effects of im-
port protection are negative, we have a magniﬁcation effect. The effect of import protection on welfare
through mean income is magniﬁed by the impact through inequality. Because of this magniﬁcation effect,
net effects remain unambiguous and negative.
Corollary 2 In a small, asset-rich Heckscher-Ohlin economy, where the mean real-income effects of im-
port protection are negative, we have a mitigation effect. The effect of import protection on welfare through
meanincomeisatleastpartiallyoffsetbytheimpactthroughinequality. FromObservation1andequations
(30) and (31) the net welfare effect is ambiguous. It depends on the speciﬁcation and parameterization of
the underlying social welfare function.
Corollary 3 The impact of protection on inequality as measured by the Atkinson and Gini indexes will be
weaker, in a Heckscher-Ohlin economy, for large countries. This is because of terms of trade effects from
equation (38), which will dampen the goods-price to factor-price transmission mechanisms at play.
12Corollary 1 ﬂags a magniﬁcation effect, linking efﬁciency and inequality effects, in labour abundant
economies. In contrast, we instead have an offsetting effect in capital-abundant economies, as noted in
Corollary 2. This result means that, in the 2x2 model, the impact of tariffs on welfare can be ambiguous
for small economies when inequality matters. This stands in contrast to a standard result of the classic 2x2
model, where tariffs are unambiguously welfare-reducing for small countries. Corollary 3 follows because
our tariff analytics are driven by the transmission of tariff changes into price changes, and these are weaker
in larger economies. These smaller internal price effects mean smaller inequality effects.
4.2 Social Welfare with Inequality in the Speciﬁc Factors Model
Next, consider the speciﬁc factors model. We can make a similar manipulation of equation (35), yielding
equation (39), for the standard 2-good, 3-factor model. This yields equation (40) below. Again, if we
assume that inequality follows from the ownership pattern of (speciﬁc) assets (ki)), then in this case a shift
in income shares through protection from more to less concentrated factors (in terms of the concentration
of factor ownership) yields a reduction in inequality. The same points then follow, as before, with regard
to country size and inequality effects in the Heckscher-Ohlin model. Otherwise, the impact of protection






















We can summarize our results with respect to the Ricardo-Viner model as follows:
Observation 2 In a small 2x3 Ricardo-Viner economy, with inequality determined by uneven distribution
of both speciﬁc factors, tariffs will cause inequality to fall if the income share of both speciﬁc factors falls,
implying also that the share for the mobile factor will also rise.
From equation (40), changes in inequality indexes depend strictly on a weighted sum of the change in
the share of income going to both forms of sector-speciﬁc assets,
∂βki
∂τ . Weights are assigned to households





that the change in incomes for households holding more assets than average, and hence more income than
average, determine the sign of the income effect. As a result we will have a fall in inequality as long as all
asset income shares decline.
Observation 3 Unless the conditions in Observation 2 are met, the impact of protection on inequality as
measured by the Gini or Atkinson index, like the impact of a tariff on income for the mobile factor itself, is
ambiguous in the Ricardo-Viner model when speciﬁc factor ownership patterns are the source of inequality.
Observation 3 follows from the need to sign the ﬁnal terms in square brackets in equation (40). In
the special case covered by Observation 2, we can unambiguously make a statement about inequality.
In the more general case however, we can generate examples where the tariff-induced changes in the
13speciﬁc-factor share of income may vary in sign between the two sectors. Depending on the distribution of
ownership, functional forms, and the share of unskilled labor in total income in the benchmark, inequality
may then rise or fall. For example, in a developing country where the poor have unskilled labor and land,
and the rich unskilled labor and capital, protection will make the concentration of income worse, assuming
the sector using capital is an import-competing sector. On the other hand, if ownership of land is very
highly concentrated relative to capital, import protection may improve the distribution of income.
Following from Observation 3 and equations (30) and (31), we can state that in the standard 2x3 model,
if the induced change in inequality is large enough and of the correct sign, it can offset the impact of the
change in average income levels. This all depends on the underlying functional forms in the model and the
parameterization of the social welfare function. If inequality is not improved, then the worsening inequality
magniﬁes the negative efﬁciency effects of small-country tariff incidence. This is summarized as follows.
Corollary 4 In a small Ricardo-Viner country, import protection may be welfare improving even though
average incomes will fall.
5 The Setting of Trade Policy
At this point, we could invoke a variety of different political economy models to generate political un-
derpinnings for the setting of an equilibrium tariff in the political marketplace. These models have been
extensively analyzed in the recent literature12, and following Helpman (1995) we note that many of these
can be represented, in reduced form, by the now standard political support function.
Direct democracy is a rare political mechanism and public policies are more usually decided by rep-
resentative governments that balance conﬂicting interests. From Hillman (1989) we know that when one
of the factors is sufﬁciently concentrated across only a few households, these individuals can organize to
form pressure groups and overcome the free-rider problem. In such cases, Grossman and Helpman (2002)
have demonstrated that in the reduced form the policy maker has two arguments to consider: the general
interest and the interest of special groups (for example capital owners and unions). The interest of the
government can follow from electoral support when social welfare is increasing and electoral contributions
go with lobbying. For example, in the 2x2 model, investors in a poor labor-abundant country can offer a
contribution to induce the policy-maker to increase import protection.
The precise weight the policy maker assigns to each group is established by her political support func-
tion, as in equation (41).
U (τ) = λ1SW (τ) + λ2ρ(τ) (41)
where U is the policy-maker’s utility, ρ represents (lobbying) rents generated for government through
protection, and where we assume that the tariff level is the only policy instrument of the government. The
12See for example Helpman (1995) and Grossman and Helpman (2002).
14weights λ characterize the political system (how important are the contributions for the electoral campaign)
and the policy-makers preferences (how she values reelection against more contributions).
Conditional on the particular values of these weights, she maximizes her utility by the ﬁrst order con-












∂τ has been already deﬁned in equations (36) and (37). Since ρ is the fraction of the capi-
tal/asset rents that are assigned to political contributions,
∂ρ(τ)
∂τ > 0 until the optimum tariff for investors
is reached. (Mayer 1984)






. From equations (36) and (37) the tariff impact on an inequality-adjusted social welfare
function can induce changes to the standard results of the political support model. Thus, there is not
necessarily a trade-off between both right hand side terms in equation (41) and in some cases they can
reinforce each other.
If we analyze small open economies and consider only the social welfare implications (or identically
where λ2 = 0), when the distributional effect of the tariff compensates for more than the efﬁciency losses
incurred we will observe a positive optimum tariff rate. From Corollary 2, in the 2x2 case this can be the
case only for capital-abundant countries. On the other hand, from Corollary 1, in poor 2x2 countries the
distributional and efﬁciency effects reinforce each other and the socially optimum tariff is zero, though the
equilibrium rate may be positive when λ2 > 0. In a speciﬁc factors setting (see below) things are less
clear-cut.
When the inﬂuence of special interest groups is introduced, the previous partial results can change. In
a capital-abundant 2x2 country, the capital-owners have an incentive to lower tariffs, and if the workers
can organize, they lobby to increase tariffs. The ﬁnal outcome depends on the speciﬁc rents each group
obtains and its political inﬂuence. In labor-abundant 2x2 countries positive tariffs can be explained by the
presence of an effective lobby, and in capital rich countries they can be explained by equity concerns that
partially overcome free trade lobbying.
These multiple outcomes are summarized as follows:
Observation 4 In a Hecksher-Ohlin world, with homogeneous labor owners, concentrated capital and a
policy-maker that cares about equity and assigns no weight to political contributions, the government’s
optimum tariff is higher in capital-abundant countries than in labor-abundant countries.
From Theorem 1, tariffs will lead to a rise (fall) in inequality depending on whether a country is capital
rich (poor). In conjunction with equations (28) and (29), this means that tariffs have a positive (negative)
impact on welfare, all other things equal, in capital rich (poor) countries mapped through inequality effects.
Hence tariffs are better than represented by mean effects alone in rich countries, and worse than in poor
countries. So the government’s optimum tariff is then higher in capital-abundant countries than in labor-
abundant countries.
15Starting from Observation 4, once we introduce a non-zero weight for lobbyists (λ2 > 0) we can then
have the following corollaries.
Corollary 5 In a Hecksher-Ohlin capital-abundant economy, with relatively greater inequality aversion,
while capital owners will lobby for lower tariffs, the government will be relatively more protectionist be-
cause of equity reasons than otherwise. Equity concerns then offset to some extent pressure for lower tariffs
in the political marketplace.
Corollary 6 In a Hecksher-Ohlin labor-abundant economy, with relatively greater inequality aversion,
the government will favor relatively lower tariffs for equity and efﬁciency reasons, but will be lobbied by
capitalists for higher tariffs. Equity concerns then offset to some extent pressure for higher tariffs in the
political marketplace.
Basically, when the distributional effects are not signiﬁcant enough to upset the efﬁciency losses im-
posed by the tariff, the common results of the literature emerge and higher tariffs are directly associated
to the weight and the contributions of special interest groups. At the same time though, in the presence of
distributional concerns rich countries tend to impose higher tariffs than otherwise. Relatively high average
tariffs across a subset of capital-rich countries can then be seen as a consequence of greater inequality con-
siderations by the relevant policy-makers, as well as the presence of inﬂuential unions. In poor countries
positive tariff rates are a direct consequence of the investor lobby overcoming both equity and efﬁciency
concerns of the government. In developing countries with a political system that assigns a signiﬁcantly
higher weight to social welfare than average, tariffs should remain lower than otherwise.
Asimilaranalyticalexercisecanbecarriedoutwitha2x3speciﬁc-factorsmodel. Inparticular, ignoring
equity concerns, we have an equilibrium tariff that balances the efﬁciency effects of the tariff against the
interests of owners of sector 1 and sector 2 capital. However, unlike the results for the Heckscher-Ohlin
model we developed here, we will not then have unambiguous results when we add inequality to the
policy objective mix. This is because, from Observation 3, the inequality impact of a tariff may itself be
ambiguous. If a tariff reduces inequality in the region of the political equilibrium, we would again expect
the equity-conscious government to be more protectionist than otherwise. If not, we expect the opposite to
hold. Like real wage effects, inequality effects also prove ambiguous in the 3x2 model, so that functional
forms and parameters (or in the real world: preferences, technologies and endowments) all need to be given
weight before an answer can be given.
6 Conclusions
We have explored theoretical linkages between import protection and the household distribution of income.
This complements the existing literature that links trade policy to factor incomes and the functional distri-
bution of income, which is well developed in the literature. The main insight of this literature is provided
by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem and constitutes a ﬁrst step in our analysis. In a general equilibrium
16context,tariffchangesultimatelyaffectthehouseholddistributionthroughvariationsinownershippatters
in conjunction with Stolper-Samuelson effects. To model ownership structures, we used the Heckscher-
Ohlin and Ricardo-Viner trade models. Within both frameworks, we are then able to produce theoretical
predictions between trade protection, country size, level of development, and personal income inequality.
Another contribution of this paper is that we examine the formal link between social welfare and the
equilibrium determinants of the distribution of income. Using Sen-type social welfare functions, we de-
compose the general equilibrium welfare effects of import protection into real income level and distribution
components. The dispersion component is estimated using Gini and Atkinson inequality indexes. With
these explicit inequality derivatives we map import protection to inequality-adjusted welfare. In addition,
when standard trade models are employed this framework also yields predictions relating social welfare
with protection, country size and levels of development. In conjunction with the relevant inequality index,
the general form of the decomposition of welfare and inequality we develop here may also be useful in
applied general equilibrium applications focused on inequality.
Once the distributional effects of trade liberalization are determined, we can apply endogenous tariff
formation models to assess how the optimum tariff is affected by equity concerns. In representative demo-
cratic systems, we ﬁnd that positive optimum tariffs can be sustained in capital-abundant countries even
when the policy-maker assigns a low or zero weight to the contributions of special interests groups. In this
case, the positive distributional effect of import protection can offset or compensate the efﬁciency losses
of reduced trade. In poor countries, characterized by the relative abundance of labor, positive tariffs are
explained by the inﬂuence of special interest groups (i.e. capitalists) that heavily lobby for higher tariffs.
Thus, import protection in developing countries not only diminishes social welfare through efﬁciency and
equity considerations, but also signals the economic and political weight of the capital-owners.
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